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tained growth of output per capita in all four economies, averaging some 6 to 7 percent per annum for two and a half decades, is truly remarkable. It is this record of growth, along with its apparent association with the rapid growth of manufactured exports, that has led most economists to believe that productivity growth in these economies must be extraordinarily high, particularly in their manufacturing sectors. This view, however, ignores an equally remarkable record of factor accumulation. Table I shows, one important area of factor accumulation has been labor input. The rapid postwar decline in birth rates (changing dependency ratios) and rising rates of female labor force participation have led to a substantial rise in the aggregate participation rate in each of the NICs.2 In moving to measures of output per worker, rising participation rates remove an average of 1 percent per annum from the per capita growth rate of Hong Kong, 1.2 and 1.3 percent per annum, from Korea and Taiwan, respectively, and a stunning 2.6 percent per annum (for 24 years!) from the growth rate of Singapore. Intersectoral transfers of labor have also been important. Thus, removing agriculture from the analysis lowers the growth rate of output per worker in Taiwan and South Korea by 0.6 and 0.7 percent per annum, respectively, reflecting the rapid decline in the share of agricultural employment in total employment in both economies.3 Although the growth of manufacturing output has been unusually rapid in these economies, so has the growth of manufacturing employment. Once one accounts for the transfer of labor into manufacturing, one finds, surprisingly, that, with regard to labor productivity growth, manufacturing in both Singapore and Taiwan actually underperformed the aggregate economy.
Capital input has also grown rapidly in the NICs. As shown in Figure I , although the investment to GDP ratio has remained roughly constant in Hong Kong, in the other NICs it has risen substantially over time. In Singapore the constant price investment to GDP ratio, at 10 percent in 1960 had reached 39 percent by 1980 and an extraordinary 47 percent by 1984, after which it declined substantially, only to begin another rise in the late 1980s. In South Korea, investment rates, which were around 5 percent (in constant prices) in the early 1950s, exploded up to 20 percent in the late 1960s, reached 30 percent by the late 1970s, and were approaching 40 percent by 1991. Finally, in Taiwan the constant 645 price investment to GDP ratio, at around 10 percent in the early 1950s, grew steadily to a high of 27 percent in 1975, after which it fluctuated around a value of about 22 percent.
Human capital accumulation in the East Asian NICs has also been quite rapid. As shown in Table II above, over the past two and a half decades the proportion of the working population in each economy with a secondary education or more has almost tripled or, in the case of Singapore, even quadrupled. By 1990/1991, some 18 to 20 percent of the working population in each NIC had some tertiary education.4 In weighting labor input by sex, age, and educational characteristics (discussed further below), I have found that the improving educational attainment of the workforce contributes to about 1 percent per annum additional growth in labor input in each of these economies.
All of the influences noted above-rising participation rates, intersectoral transfers of labor, improving levels of education, and expanding investment rates-serve to chip away at the productivity performance of the East Asian NICs, drawing them from the top of Mount Olympus down to the plains of Thessaly. In a companion paper [Young 1994 ], I use simple back-of-the-envelope calculations and large international data sets to show that, with regard to productivity growth in the aggregate economy and in manufacturing in particular, the NICs cannot be considered to be strong outliers in the postwar world economy. This paper concentrates on a more careful analysis of these four economies, making use of the extensive statistical record embodied in their national accounts, population censuses, and sectoral, wage, and labor force surveys.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a short review of methodology. Sections III-VI then provide a country-by-country analysis of aggregate and sectoral total factor productivity growth. Section VII contrasts this research with earlier work on productivity growth in the NICs, while Section VIII summarizes and concludes. An Appendix provides a description of sources and some of the problems encountered in linking different data series. and where the 0i's denote the elasticity of output with respect to each input or, equivalently, assuming perfect competition, the share of each input in total factor payments. The translog index of TFP growth (TFPT 1,T) provides a measure of the increase in output attributable to the time-related shift in the production function. In essence, the translog production function provides a theoretical justification for the use of average factor shares and log differences as a means of extending the continuous time Divisia analysis of productivity growth to data based upon discrete time periods. and where the Oi's denote the elasticity of each aggregate input with respect to each of its component subinputs or, again assuming perfect competition, the share of each subinput in total payments to its aggregate factor. In a manner analogous to the continuous time Divisia analysis, these indices adjust for improvements in the "quality" of aggregate capital and labor input by, to a first-order approximation, weighting the growth of each subinput by its average marginal product. The appropriate measure of capital and labor input is the flow of services emanating from those inputs. For labor, one can reasonably assume that the flow of services is proportional to total hours of work; i.e., Lj(T) = XLjHj(T), with Before proceeding further, it is worth considering whether deviations from the restrictive assumptions of the model outlined above might not lead to a downward bias in estimates of total factor productivity growth, and hence explain the low estimates reported in this paper. The absence of perfect competition, in the context of a constant returns to scale production function, could lead to mismeasurement of the elasticity of output with respect to each input, as factor shares need no longer reflect output elasticities. In particular, to the degree that monopoly profits are reflected in capital income, capital's income share will tend to overstate the elasticity of output with respect to capital. The reader can make an easy correction for this factor by adjusting the aggregate shares of capital and labor in the tables presented further below. However, since physical capital accumulation is only a small part of the NIC story, with increases in labor participation and educational attainment and the intersectoral transfer of labor all playing an equally important role,7 within reasonable bounds adjustments along these lines are not likely to produce spectacular productivity estimates for the NICs.8
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Relaxation of the assumption of constant returns to scale could either increase or decrease the productivity estimates. If the true aggregate production function is characterized by increasing returns to scale, perhaps due to externalities among factors, then the growth accounting residual actually overstates the true degree of productivity growth, since it captures the increase in production externalities brought about by the increase in factors of production. Conversely, if the true production is characterized by decreasing returns to scale, the growth accounting residual understates the degree of productivity growth. 7. Table XV summarizes the quantitative contribution of each factor toward reducing the estimate of productivity growth.
8. With the exception of Singapore, the NIC labor shares are about two-thirds, i.e., consistent with the standard prior on the elasticity of output with respect to labor. Singapore's share is, however, substantially lower. Raising its share to that of, say, Hong Kong, raises the estimate of average total factor productivity growth from 0.2 to 0.8 per annum, which, while certainly more respectable, is not spectacular. In this regard, I should note that in order to bias my estimates in favor of Singapore I make use of the labor income share reported in the Singapore Input-Output Tables, which is substantially greater than that indicated by unpublished data on labor income provided to me by the Singaporean government.
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Finally, it is worth addressing a common misconception concerning growth accounting adjustments for the "quality" of labor and capital input; i.e., that these adjustments implicitly incorporate any embodiment of technological change in those inputs. Fundamentally, the growth accounting procedure assumes that input i today is the same as it was yesterday; i.e., that a secondary educated 25-year-old female worker today is identical to a secondary educated 25-year-old female worker yesterday. In so doing, the procedure places any increase in the productivity of that input (whether or not embodied) into the residual. The weighting of capital and labor input in equation (5) above is no more than an extension of the standard two-factor (capital/labor) analysis, in which each factor is weighted by its income share, to the consideration of more numerous inputs which, for analytical convenience, are differentiated into lists of "capital" and "labor" inputs.9
B. Measuring Factor Supplies
My analysis focuses on two aggregate inputs, capital and labor, subdivided into finer subinput categories. In general, I divide capital input into five categories: residential buildings, nonresidential buildings, other durable structures, transport equipment, and machinery. With the exception of my analysis of Singaporean manufacturing, I do not include land input, which is difficult to measure. To minimize any error, I focus my analysis of Taiwan and Korea on the nonagricultural economy, where land input accounts 9. This is not to say, however, that the measure of technical progress is independent of the quantity of factors, or the path of factor accumulation. Consider an isoquant that shifts in nonuniformly (i.e., in a non-Hicks-neutral fashion). In this case, the measured improvement in productivity will vary according to the capital-labor ratio of the economy, and the degree to which that capital-labor ratio changes during the period under analysis. If one estimates the production function, one can avoid this problem by describing the full movement of the surface, rather than simply decomposing changes along a particular path of factor accumulation.
One referee queried, if technological improvement led to an improvement in capital goods quality, and hence in a reduction in real capital goods prices, would the increase in capital goods productivity show up in the growth accounting residual? If the capital goods are imported, then the answer is, quite appropriately, no. However, if the capital goods are domestically produced, then if the price indices for capital goods production are quality adjusted, then so are the quantity indices. Thus, the increase in quality in the capital goods sector would show up as a rise in value added per unit of input in that sector and, when aggregated with other sectors, in the aggregate economy. In this regard, it is interesting to note that between 1966 and 1990 the ratio of the capital goods to GDP deflator rose by 1.2 percent per annum in Hong Kong, but fell by -0.2 percent per annum in Singapore, -1.8 percent per annum in South Korea, and -1.1 percent per annum in Taiwan. The decline in relative capital goods prices in South Korea and Taiwan partially offsets the reduction in capital returns induced by the approximately 3 percent per annum rise in the capital-output ratio in those economies.
for only a small percentage of total payments to factors of production.'l Labor is distinguished on the basis of sex (two categories), age (nine to eleven categories, depending upon the country and time period under consideration), and education (two to seven categories).
I estimate the capital stock using the standard perpetual inventory approach with geometric depreciation." In following this approach, it is customary to initialize the capital stock series using a benchmark survey, such as a national wealth survey. In the case of the NICs, this approach is not productive. Neither Hong Kong nor Singapore has ever conducted such a survey, while, in the case of South Korea and Taiwan, the survey results are greatly at odds with the annual investment flows recorded in the national accounts. 12. I cumulate the national accounts investment at constant prices of the date of the wealth survey. The gross values reported in the wealth surveys represent, similarly, the product of a purchase price times a price index reflecting asset inflation up to the time of the survey. The price indices for the wealth surveys are drawn from sources similar to those used by the national accounts, e.g., wholesale price indices, and, when reported, as in the Korean national wealth surveys, roughly parallel the national accounts deflators for similar asset types. Thus, the incongruities noted below seem to be more related to differences in the original current price values recorded in the surveys and national accounts, rather than differences in the deflators used to adjust these values to a common standard.
13. In principle, because of scrapping, the wealth survey gross assets should actually be less than the cumulative national accounts investment. Turning now to the measurement of labor inputs, my task is to estimate the working population, cross-classified by up to seven attributes, i.e., sex, age, education, industry, income, hours of work, and class of worker (i.e., employee, self-employed, etc.). Census and survey data frequently contain information on row and column sums in lower dimensions. Under the assumption that there are no interactions across attributes other than those present in the available subdimensional tables, I derive an approximation of the maximum likelihood estimate of each cell using the iterative proportional fitting technique suggested by Bishop, Fienberg, and Holland [1975] . In general, I make use of the information provided by additional worker characteristics, e.g., occupation, which, in their cross-tabulation with attributes of interest to me provide additional information. Thus, for example, I actually estimate the 1990 Singaporean working population cross-classified by sex x age x education x industry x income x class of worker x occupation, using all available census tabulations.20 For my TFP estimates, I then sum across occupational categories to derive a reduced six-dimensional table of the variables of interest to me.
All four economies conduct occasional censuses and, on a more regular annual basis, surveys of labor force conditions. With regard to the overall size of the labor force, however, the labor force surveys provide little additional independent information over and above that derived from the census. Each survey is typically based upon a small sample2l which must then be scaled up to a national estimate. The factors used to accomplish this scaling are usually drawn from the previous census. In essence, the reported survey results are a modified extrapolation of the previous census. Given the rapid transformation experienced by these economies, the results can, on occasion, be grossly inaccurate. The 1990 Census, however, found that the actual working population numbered 1,537,011 (i.e., 20 percent more than reported in the previous survey). The 1991 Labor Force Survey of Singapore (using updated 1990 scaling factors) then estimated the working population at 1,524,315. In the estimates below, I confine myself to census years, treating the census results as the appropriate measure of the "population" and the survey results as a "sample," making use of these, when they contain cross tabulations that are unavailable in the census, by conforming the survey row and column totals to those given by the census. Since, over the long run, the labor force surveys track (with large variance) the census, the long-term average rates of productivity growth reported below are not dependent on this choice of sources.22
Finally, I should note that to improve the accuracy of my labor force estimates I have acquired thousands of pages of unpublished census tabulations from the governments of Hong Kong and Singapore, while, in the case of Taiwan, I have made use of the Chinese language area and district census tabulations, which contain additional tabulations over and beyond those reported in the summary English language volumes. These additional tabulations provide valuable information. Thus, for example, unpublished Hong Kong tabulations provide information on income by age, sex, and education cross-tabulated by class of worker (e.g., self-employed, employee, etc.). In contrast, the published tabulations rarely cross-tabulate income with class of worker. Consequently, relying on the published tabulations alone pollutes one's estimates of the returns to different types of labor input with nonlabor capital income.
C. Measuring Factor Shares
In order to estimate the share of labor and capital in total payments to factors of production, it is necessary to measure value added from the point of view of the producer. This requires removing all indirect business taxes on the value of output (including all sales and excise taxes), while retaining all subsidies 22. In fact, during the period emphasized in this paper ) the labor force surveys actually imply faster growth in the nonagricultural working population in both South Korea and Taiwan (the labor force surveys for Hong Kong and Singapore began in the mid-to late 1970s and hence do not cover the entire period of analysis). and taxes on factors of production (such as license fees and profits taxes), a concept of value added midway between GDP at factor cost and GDP at market prices. In the case of Hong Kong, where indirect taxes are minimal, I simply take as my measure of value added the national accounts estimates of GDP at current factor cost. In the case of the other economies, where indirect taxes are more significant, I use published and unpublished data on tax revenues to separate out the "admissible" indirect taxes, i.e., those that are part of the value of output from the point of view of the producer, and allocate them to the different economic sectors.23
To estimate the share of labor in total factor payments, I begin by constructing estimates of the hourly incomes of employees cross-tabulated by industry, sex, age, and education. I then use these compensation data, and my estimates of hours of work cross-tabulated by industry, sex, age, education, and class of worker, to estimate the incomes of employees and the implicit labor income of employers, unpaid family workers, and the selfemployed, under the assumption that the latter earn an implicit wage equal to the hourly wage of employees with similar sex, age, educational, and industrial characteristics. To determine the share of labor in each sector, I then multiply the sectoral compensation of employees data reported in the national accounts by one plus my sectoral estimates of the ratio of implicit to explicit labor income.24 Combining my measures of implicit and explicit income provides an estimate of sectoral labor income cross-classified by the sex, age, and educational characteristics of workers and, hence, an estimate of the share of each labor subinput in total payments to labor by sector.
Turning to capital input, under the assumption of perfect competition and constant returns to scale, I take the aggregate share of capital by sector to be simply one minus the estimated share of labor. To allocate capital income by asset type, I note that with geometric depreciation, and perfect foresight, the rental price 23. I should note that while I make this adjustment to value added for the purposes of measuring income shares, I use value added at market prices to measure the growth of output, under the assumption that these prices better reflect the relative scarcities and values of the component products of national output. In this sense, my approach parallels that of the national accounts, where income is typically measured at factor cost and output at market prices.
24. This rescaling using the national accounts data corrects for underreporting of income on the part of workers and, also, adjusts for labor taxes and nonmonetary compensation, all of which form a part of the cost of labor input from the point of view of the producer.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS of a capital good ki is given by25 (8) Pk.(T) = P1,(T -1)r(T) + 8P1,(T) -[P1,(T) -P1,(T -1)],
where PI denotes the investment price of capital good i and r(T) is the nominal rate of return between periods T -1 and T. Under the assumption that all assets earn the same nominal rate of return, I vary r(T) until total payments to capital equal my estimate of the aggregate share of capital. This yields estimates of the rental price of each asset category and, by extension, its share of payments to capital.
III. HONG KONG
Table V presents estimates of total factor productivity growth in Hong Kong. With the exception of the 1981-1986 period, when business activity was depressed by the Anglo-Chinese negotiations over the future of the colony, Hong Kong sustained total factor productivity growth rates of 2 percent or more in each of the five-year periods, averaging 2.3 percent over the 1966-1991 period as a whole. As one would expect, given the relative constancy of the post-1966 investment to GDP ratio, there is little evidence of capital deepening, with weighted capital input growing only 0.7 percent faster per annum than output during the 1966-1991 period. As the table shows, the weighting of capital and labor input raises, but only slightly, the estimated growth rate of these factors of production. In the case of capital, weighting raises the growth rate somewhat by placing a greater emphasis on the rapidly growing stock of machinery.26 In the case of labor, adjustments for sex, hours of work, and age (prior to 1976) lower the growth rate of effective labor input, while adjustments for education and age (after 1976) raise its effective growth rate, with the net effect being slightly positive on average. Weighting is, however, of substantial importance during individual periods, for example during the late 1980s, when the stabilization of female participation rates, aging of 25. This equation can be modified to take into account taxes and depreciation allowances, and one can also relax the assumption of perfect foresight and incorporate a measure of the "expected" change in asset prices. These adjustments, however, are relatively minor compared with the basic concept embodied in equation (8); i.e., that assets with high depreciation rates and declining relative prices (such as machinery and equipment) should command comparatively higher rentals and, by extension, factor shares. In the case of the NICs, where machinery and equipment is one of the most rapidly growing elements of the capital stock, this raises the growth rate of the aggregate (weighted) capital stock.
26. See footnote 25. the labor force, and rising educational attainment, all served to increase measured labor input. These patterns are repeated in the other economies and, for reasons of space, will, in general, not be commented upon further.27 IV. SINGAPORE Table VI presents estimates of total factor productivity growth in Singapore. Although the late 1960s appear to have been a period of rapid productivity growth, these gains were largely lost during the 1970s and 1980s. With weighted capital input growing an average of 2.8 percent per annum faster than output and output per unit of effective labor input growing only 3.0 percent per annum, the total factor productivity residual for the aggregate economy averages a rather low 0.2 percent per annum. Interestingly, although the growth of capital input has slowed down over time (as the investment rate has stabilized around 40 percent of GDP), the growth of human capital has accelerated. While weighted labor input grew 2.1 percent more slowly than raw labor in the late 1960s, it rose 3.0 percent faster in the 1980s (due to large increases in the age and educational attainment of the workforce). The changing role of physical and human capital accumulation in sustaining growth is reflected in the decline in the growth of output 27. Tables detailing the impact of each adjustment (age, sex, etc.) in each subperiod for the four economies are available upon request from the author. 28. Although much of manufacturing output is undeflated, the reader should not jump to the conclusion that the IIP overstates the growth of the manufacturing sector. While the undeflated items include many products whose prices have probably been increasing (e.g., printing and transport equipment), they also include As shown in Table VI, over the 1970 to 1990 period as a whole total factor productivity growth in Singaporean manufacturing averaged -1.0 percent per annum, a performance slightly below that of the aggregate economy during the same period. As in the case of the aggregate economy, the principal source of low productivity growth in Singaporean manufacturing is the combination of a slow growth of output per weighted worker29 (1.5 percent per annum) and a rapid fall in output per unit of capital input (-2.7 percent per annum). Given the IIP's questionable (i.e., nonexistent) deflators, these estimates are clearly grossly inaccurate and are simply meant to show what can be accomplished at the sectoral level given the current state of Singaporean data.
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V. SOUTH KOREA Table VII below presents total factor productivity growth estimates for South Korea. Although South Korea exhibits even more capital deepening than Singapore, with output per unit of effective capital input falling 3.4 percent per annum, the larger labor share and faster growth of output per effective worker (3.9 percent) combine to give the economy a considerably larger total factor productivity residual (1.7 percent). Productivity growth in the Korean economy appears to have improved over time, with the average 2.5 percent growth of the 1980s well above the 0.8 and 1.0 percent growth experienced during the 1960s and 1970s, respectively. Turning to the industry level analysis,30 we see that manufacturing has had the highest average level of productivity growth. Productivity growth in manufacturing fluctuates dramatimany electronics products, whose prices have undoubtedly been declining. Interestingly, at one point the Singaporean statistical authorities, who were concerned about their methodology, sought the assistance of the Japanese on this issue, but were assured that nondeflation of manufacturing output was also common practice in that economy (!).
29. Since the CIP does not contain any information on the age or educational characteristics of the workers in the firms surveyed, I use census data to adjust for the age and educational characteristics of the workforce under the assumption that the workers in the CIP shared the same age and education characteristics as similar sex persons reported as manufacturing workers in the census.
30. The Korean national accounts include data on capital formation by asset type and by industry, but not by asset type and industry. After removing residential investment from service investment (where all residential investment would occur), I estimate each sector's capital stock by cumulating the (indifferentiated) industry investment, using the average nonresidential depreciation rate in the economy (as computed from the asset type data). I then add residential capital back into the service sector. Since I am only able to differentiate capital input in services (where it is subdivided into residential and nonresidential capital), I only compute weighted capital measures for that sector. cally from period to period, but averages 2 to 3 percent per decade. Productivity growth in other industry and services, while also volatile, has improved on a decade-by-decade basis, with, in particular, a dramatic rise in other industry from -2.0 percent in the 1960s to 1.9 percent in the 1970s and 4.0 percent in the 1980s.
Although the results are not reported in the table, I should note that I have estimated productivity growth in the subsectors of other industry and services, finding average total factor productivity growth rates (during the 1966-1990 period) of -1.1 percent in mining, 5.2 percent in electricity, gas, and water, 2.2 percent in construction, 3.4 percent in transport, storage and communications, and -0.1 percent in finance, insurance, real estate and business services (1970-1990). Table VIII presents total factor productivity growth estimates for Taiwan. With output per unit of weighted capital input falling 2.9 percent per annum, but output per effective worker rising 4.5 percent per annum (the fastest growth in this sample of four economies), Taiwan exhibits an average rate of productivity growth 
VI. TAIWAN
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comparable to that of Hong Kong (2.6 percent). As Table VIII shows, the sectoral pattern of productivity growth in Taiwan is markedly different from that in Korea. In the Taiwanese economy manufacturing and other industry appear to be productivity laggards (with average growth rates of 1.7 and 1.4 percent, respectively), while services seems to have played the role of the productivity powerhouse (with an average growth of 3.5 percent per annum). Strong differences in the performance of Taiwan and Korea are also apparent within the more detailed sectors of "other industry." Thus, over the 1966-1990 period total factor productivity rose 3.7 percent per annum in Taiwanese mining (as compared with a decline of -1.1 percent per annum in Korea) and fell -0.2 percent per annum in Taiwanese electricity, gas, and water (as compared with rapid growth of 5.2 percent per annum in Korea). Elsewhere, the performance of the two economies was more similar, with productivity in Taiwan rising 1.5 percent per annum in construction (2.2 percent Korea), 4.7 percent per annum in transport, storage, and communications (3.4 percent Korea), and 0.2 percent per annum in finance, insurance, real estate, and business services (-0.1 percent Korea).
It is important to note that part of the extraordinary performance of Taiwanese services is due to the unusual approach taken by the Taiwanese national accounts to the measurement of public sector output. Whereas most national accounts authorities deflate public sector output by the wages of different types of public sector employees, leading to an approximately zero growth in output per effective worker, the Taiwanese national accounts incorporate a "quality adjustment," allowing for the growing (unmeasurable) productivity of public sector employees. According to my estimates, between 1966 and 1990 output per effective worker in the Taiwanese public sector grew 4.4 percent per annum (6.6 percent per annum if one includes military personnel in the denominator.)31 31. The reason the Taiwanese national accounts make this adjustment is fairly obvious. With public sector employment stagnating and output per worker in all other sectors of the economy growing rapidly, backward extrapolation (at constant prices of the mid-1980s) using the standard deflation technique implies that the share of the government in total output was about 50 percent in 1966. A similar problem exists in the U. S. national accounts, but is ameliorated by the fact that public sector employment is expanding rapidly, while the growth of the other sectors of the economy is more gradual than in Taiwan. The solution I employ (in Table IX ), is to estimate the growth of aggregate output as a Tornqvist index of the growth of the one-digit ISIC sectors (plus the public sector), with the (chain-linked) current price share of each sector taken as its weight. This approach is analogous to that used by Griliches and Jorgenson [1967] for the measurement of the output of the U. S. economy. Table IX provides additional total factor productivity measures for Taiwan, where I have adjusted the national accounts measure of public sector output to conform to the more standard (zero growth) deflation technique. As the reader can see, this adjustment has a large impact on the aggregate nonagricultural economy, where productivity growth falls to an average of 2.1 percent, and an even stronger impact on services, where productivity growth now appears to have averaged 2.6 percent (which nevertheless remains higher than manufacturing and other industry).32 Table IX also presents estimates for the nonpublic sector nonagricultural Taiwanese economy, which sidesteps these measurement issues by excluding the public sector from consideration.33 I find that total factor productivity growth in the nonagricultural private sector Taiwanese military personnel as part of public sector employment, then the quality adjustment of public sector output in the Taiwanese national accounts appears to be even more exaggerated. Adjusting public sector output to standard deflation techniques yields an average total factor productivity growth rate of 2.1 percent (Table  X) , i.e., the same as that reported earlier (excluding military personnel) in Table IX . Similar estimates for services yield average rates of productivity growth of 3.7 and 2.3 percent, which are only 0.2 percent greater and 0.3 percent less, respectively, than the comparable figures reported earlier above. In sum, the estimates for Taiwan are not extremely sensitive to the inclusion of military personnel, particularly once one adjusts the growth of public sector output to international norms. The impact of military personnel in Korea, where they constitute a much smaller percentage of the working population, should be even smaller.
VII. COMPARISON WITH EARLIER RESEARCH
This paper is by no means the first rigorous study of total factor productivity growth in the East Asian NICs. Of these, by far of r(T) (equation (8) earlier) and, by extension, the weights assigned to each capital good. Table XI 37. Of the difference, 1.4 percent is due to the more rapid growth in factor input, and 1.1 percent to the slower growth of output during the latter period. 
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Pyo, Kong, Kwon, and Kim [1993] estimate an aggregate rate of total factor productivity growth for the 1970-1990 period of 1.3 percent per annum. This study includes agriculture in the measure of output, but excludes both land and inventories from the capital stock measure. Consequently, Pyo, Kong, Kwon, and Kim record extremely rapid growth in the capital stock, in a manner similar to this paper.39 Unlike this paper, however, they estimate a considerably lower share of labor, on the order of 53 percent, which explains their lower estimate of total factor productivity growth.40 Pyo, Kong, Kwon, and Kim assume that the implicit labor income of each self-employed or unpaid worker is only one-quarter that of the average employee. In contrast, I assume that each self-employed or unpaid worker earns an implicit wage equal to that of an employee in the same sector with similar age, sex, and educational characteristics. In general, most studies of Korean productivity growth have been unwilling to make this one-for-one assumption and, consequently, have lower estimates of the share of labor.41 39. In both studies mentioned above, Pyo and his coauthors make use of the national wealth surveys to estimate the capital stock. However, rather than selecting any particular year to initialize the series, they, instead, endogenously determine which depreciation rate (for net capital stock) and disposal rate ( Underlying the pervasive influence of the East Asian NICs on both theoretical and policy-oriented research in the economics profession lies a common premise: that productivity growth in these economies, particularly in their manufacturing sectors, has been extraordinarily high. The results of this paper, as summarized in Table XIII, suggest that this premise is largely incorrect. Over the past two and a half decades, productivity growth in the aggregate nonagricultural economy of the NICs ranges from a low of 0.2 percent in Singapore to a high of 2.3 percent in Hong Kong, whereas in manufacturing productivity growth ranges from a low of -1.0 percent in Singapore to a high of 3.0 percent in South Korea. For the purposes of comparison, Table XIV reproduces the results of two detailed cross-country studies of productivity growth, with methodologies similar to that used in this paper. As the reader can see, it is not particularly difficult to find either developed or less developed economies whose productivity performance, despite considerably slower growth of output per capita, has approximated or matched that of the NICs. While, with the exception of Singapore, productivity growth in the NICs is not particularly low, it is also, by postwar standards, not extraordinarily high.46
Table XV helps the reader reconcile the moderate estimates of total factor productivity growth found in this paper with the towering record of output growth in the East Asian NICs. The table begins by presenting a "naive" prior estimate of total factor productivity growth in these economies, one based solely upon observation of the growth of output per capita, the statistic most frequently encountered in broad international data sets. Assuming that the analyst's prior was that all other ratios (e.g., participation, capital-output, etc.) had remained constant, the naive estimate of total factor productivity growth would be the labor share (believed to be, say, 0.6) times the growth of output per capita.47 These, rather extraordinary, estimates of 3.4 to 4.1 percent per annum are presented on line (1) of the table. If, in addition, the analyst was aware that participation rates had risen in these economies, the 46. In this regard it is interesting to note that Lau and Kim [1994] , using an econometric approach to the study of productivity growth, find that productivity growth in the NICs over the past few decades was not significantly different from zero.
47. Recall that total factor productivity growth is simply the weighted average of the growth of output per unit of labor and output per unit of capital. naive estimate would be the labor share times the growth of output per worker, or, as shown on line (2) productivity growth rates of between 2.5 and 3.4 percent per annum. Refocusing the analyst's view on the nonagricultural sector (i.e., noting the slower growth of output per worker in that sector) and informing him/her about the unusual Taiwanese approach to the measurement of public sector output,48 would lead to the estimates presented on line (3). Thus, in simply moving from the common international data on output per capita to country-specific data on output per worker in the nonagricultural sector, the analyst's naive (i.e., still assuming that other ratios remained constant) estimates of productivity growth would fall to between 2.5 to 3.0 percent per annum.
Line (4) of Table XV , which can be considered the starting point of the estimates in this paper, modifies the naive analysis to include the actual, estimated, share of labor. Since these shares are generally estimated to be above 0.6, the starting point of my analysis is somewhat above the figures on line (3). The table then shows the contribution of various factors to lowering this estimate. Weighting of labor input, i.e., taking into account changes in the age, sex, and educational composition of the workforce and adjusting for hours of work, lowers the productivity estimates by a little over half a percent in Singapore and South Korea, but by only a minimal amount in Hong Kong and Taiwan, where the common increases in educational attainment were offset by declining hours of work. With the exception of Hong Kong, capital deepening, i.e., the increase in the crude capital-output ratio brought about by the rapid rise in the investment to GDP ratio, contributes to about 1 output and capital formation, they unfortunately follow the 1968 United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) in classifying capital formation by industry of ownership, rather than by industry of use (as was the case in the Old System accounts, which followed the 1953 SNA). Provided that the ratio of ownership to use remains roughly constant over time, the New System accounts still provide a reasonable 
